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INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
ABSTRACT

Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi*

The management of international watercourses is a
prominent global issue, owing to the rapid growth of water
scarcity worldwide. This issue is particularly dominant in the
Indus Basin, which India and Pakistan share. Both states use the
water of the Indus Basin for irrigation, hydropower generation,
and multiple other purposes. However, certain Indian water
management projects are threatening the current water
management infrastructure in Pakistan by substantially
obstructing the flow of water in the Pakistani western rivers. In
this regard, the Indus Waters Treaty provides recommendations to
both states for adequately managing the Indus waters. Moreover,
there are several principles and conventions in international law
that include provisions for transboundary watercourses
management. These principles also advise states, including India
and Pakistan, on how to manage the watercourses sustainably,
how not to cause harm to other states, and how to adopt special
water management measures to prevent depletion, pollution, and
environmental degradation of watercourse basins.
*Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water scarcity is the most pressing issue of these
times.1 Pakistan has become a water-stressed country2 and is
rapidly becoming a water-scarce country.3 Therefore, it is
essential to give attention to adequately managing the water
resources available in Pakistan. The economy of Pakistan is
reliant on agriculture,4 and Pakistan is dependent on the
flow of water in the Indus River and its tributaries for
irrigating crops.5 India also shares the Indus Basin.6 The
Indus Waters Treaty is the sole legal agreement that is

Lyla Mehta, Contexts and Constructions of Water Scarcity, in, STATE OF
JUSTICE IN INDIA: ISSUES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, 58 (Ranabir Samaddar ed.,
2009) [hereinafter Mehta].
2 Tariq Fatemi, Looking Ahead, in, THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN 107, 114
(Stephen P. Cohen, 2011).
3 Muhammad Junaid Usman Akhtar et al., Public Participation and CoProduction in the Irrigation Sector of Punjab, Pakistan, in, PUBLIC SECTOR
REFORMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PARADOXES AND PRACTICES 39, 44
(Charles Conteh & Ahmed Safiqul Huque eds., 2014).
4 See Shuja Nawaz, The Clash of Interests and Objectives, in THE FUTURE OF
PAKISTAN 150, 151 (Stephen P. Cohen, 2011).
5 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, CLIMATE
AND SOCIAL STRESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS, 122 (John D.
Steinbruner et al. eds., 2013).
6 SHARAD K. JAIN ET AL., HYDROLOGY AND WATER RESOURCES OF INDIA,
507 (2007).
1
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binding on both states in the utilization of the waters of the
Indus Basin.7
The treaty includes recommendations on water
management for both states.8In addition to the Indus Waters
Treaty, there are several obligations under international law,
which include instructions for the management of
transboundary water resources for states. The Berlin Rules,
the United Nations Watercourses Convention, the Belgrade
Rules, the Supplemental Rules on Pollution, and the
Johannesburg Declaration offer instructions regarding the
management of a common river basin. This paper will
discuss these recommendations only for surface
watercourses in general and for the management of Indus
Basin; the management of groundwater and other water
resources is beyond the scope of this paper.
The second section of this paper elaborates on water
management in the Indus Basin region in Pakistan. The total
demand for the water of the Indus Basin and the average
annual flow of the water in its tributaries are discussed, as
are the factors that affect this flow of water. Indian water
storage projects and adverse changes in the climate are the
major factors responsible for harming the natural flow and
management of the water of the Indus Basin in Pakistan,
which will be discussed at the end of the first section. The
third section of this paper explains the provisions of the
Indus Waters Treaty, which recommends the construction of
water management facilities in Pakistan.

See BRAHMA CHELLANEY, WATER: ASIA'S NEW BATTLEGROUND, 278
(2013).
8 See Case Studies of Transboundary Water Management Initiatives: Fifteen
Initiatives from Various Parts of the World, in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 196 (Anton Earle et al. eds.,
2013).
7
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The fourth section explains international legal
conventions and rules, which provide instructions to
riparian states for the management of international
watercourses. Different factors such as the environmental
impacts of water management practices by a state, the duty
not to cause harm to other states by continuing water
management projects, sustainable management and
development of the watercourses, and the basin-wide joint
management of the watercourses are discussed in this
section in relation to certain water management practices in
the Indus Basin by India and Pakistan. Conclusions are
drawn briefly at the end of this paper.
II. INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN
This section of the paper elaborates on the water
management practices in the Indus Basin in Pakistan. It
explains the demand for Indus Basin water in Pakistan and
the relevant annual supply or flow of that water. The Indus
Basin holds key importance for water management practices
in Pakistan, as it is the only major source that brings a
significant amount of water to the country;9 this water is
used for irrigation, hydropower generation, industrial
projects, and domestic and municipal purposes.10 For several

Zeeshan Ali et. al., Taming Food Security Through Wastewater Irrigation
Practices, in, PLANTS, POLLUTANTS AND REMEDIATION, 116 (Ozturk et al.
eds., 2016).
10 See, Water, in, 11TH FIVE YEAR PLAN, MINISTRY OF PLANNING,
DEVELOPMENT & REFORM, GOVT. OF PAKISTAN, Chapter 20, 226 (2015)
http://pc.gov.pk/uploads//plans//Ch20-Water1.pdf
9
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centuries it has been the major resource for irrigation in the
Punjab region of Pakistan.11
The Indus Basin comprises the Indus River and its
five tributaries, the Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas
Rivers.12 Among them, the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus
Rivers were allocated for the use of Pakistan by the Indus
Waters Treaty.13 These tributaries, along with the Indus
River, irrigate major portions of agricultural land in
Pakistan.14 Furthermore, several canals and barrages have
also been constructed that use water from the Indus River
and its tributaries to irrigate crops.15 However, the
increasing stress on water resources has raised questions

Abdul Hafeezz Qaiser, Current Policy Perspective on Institutional Reforms
for the Irrigated Agriculture Sector, in, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MANAGING IRRIGATION FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN PAKISTAN 46 (M. Badruddin et al. eds.,
1996); see also DAVID GILMARTIN, BLOOD AND WATER: THE INDUS RIVER
BASIN IN MODERN HISTORY 7 (2015) [hereinafter Gilmartin].
12 See Gilmartin, supra note 11, at 14; see also APARNA PANDE, EXPLAINING
PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: ESCAPING INDIA, 43 (2011) [hereinafter
ESCAPING INDIA]; see Aparna Pande, Pakistan: Issues of Self-Identity and
Parity with India, in PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL LABYRINTHS: MILITARY, SOCIETY
AND TERROR 1, 8 (Ravi Kalia, 2016).
13 See ESCAPING INDIA, supra note 12, at 43.
14 SARFRAZ MUNIR, ROLE OF SEDIMENT TRANSPORT IN OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND BASED IRRIGATION CANALS:
APPLICATION TO MACHAI MAIRA BRANCH CANALS, 8 (2011); see also ASMI
RAZA, PAKISTAN’S QUEST FOR FOOD SECURITY, 40 (1993).
15 John D. Rogers, The Economy: Labor Agriculture, in, PAKISTAN: A
COUNTRY STUDY, Chapter 3, 173, (Peter R. Blood, ed., 1995); See also
Nasim Akhtar, The Use of Irrigation System for Sustainable Fish Production
in Pakistan, in, FISHERIES IN IRRIGATION SYSTEMS OF ARID SEA ASIA,
Chapter 2, 19, (Tomi Petr ed., 2003); SAIYID ALI NAQVI, INDUS WATERS
AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THE EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION OF AGRARIAN
SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN, 7-8 (2012).
11

2017

INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT

69

regarding the efficiency of existing water management
infrastructure in Pakistan.16
A. THE DEMAND
BASIN WATER

AND

CONSUMPTION

FOR THE

INDUS

Although the demand for water is growing in all
sectors, the annual growth in demand for water is highest in
the agriculture sector.17 According to the statistics provided
by the UNDP in its 2016 report, the net crop water
requirement in Pakistan is at 101.7 MAF percent out of the
total water consumption in the country.18 From the 143 MAF
Average Annual Flow of water, nearly 101.8 MAF is
diverted to the agricultural lands through the canal
networks; however, only 56 MAF reaches to crops due to the
conveyance losses of 45.5 MAF.19 Therefore, around 50 MAF
of groundwater is extracted to meet the shortfall, which
makes the availability of water at the farmlands at 106.5

See generally Adrien Couton, Tackling the Water Crisis in Pakistan: What
Entrepreneurial Approaches Can Add, in, WATER AND AGRICULTURE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH 85, 86 (Ctr. for Strategic &
Int’l Stud., 2009).
17 The demand for water in the Indus Basin has also started to increase
because of the yearly increase in total population. See WINSTON YU ET AL.,
THE INDUS BASIN OF PAKISTAN: THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE RISKS ON WATER
AND AGRICULTURE 35, 54 (2013); see ASHOK SWAIN, UNDERSTANDING
EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES 40-1
(2013) (discussing the impact of population increase and the demand for
water).
18 Shahid Ahmad, Water Sector of Pakistan: A Situational Analysis, in,
DEVELOPMENT ADVOCATE PAKISTAN – WATER SECURITY IN PAKISTAN:
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES, 5 (Maheen Hassan ed., December 2016)
[hereinafter Ahmad].
19 Id., at 3-5.
16
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MAF, which further falls to 79.9 MAF due to Field
Application Losses.20 Thus, a shortfall of 21.8 MAF still
exists, which mostly is met by the rainfalls.21
The agricultural sector consumes the highest quantity
of Indus water in Pakistan.22 According to an estimate, the 95
percent of irrigation in Pakistan is to be found in the Indus
River basin.23 The total area of agricultural land is
approximately 21 million hectares,24 and more than 45
percent of the population earns its livelihood in
agriculture.25 Moreover, agriculture accounts for 25 percent
of the total GDP of the country.26 Therefore, it is also
regarded as the “backbone” of Pakistan’s economy.27
On the other hand, the aforementioned net demand of
101.7 MAF by the crops is expected to rise to 116.14 MAF by
2025 forecasting a shortfall of 36.9 MAF, which highlights
the need to perform stringent measures to avoid further

Id.
Id.
22 See WORLD BANK INST., STRATEGIC REFORMS FOR AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH IN PAKISTAN, 87 (Masood Ahmad & Rashid Faruqee eds., 1999);
see 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 874 (THOMAS M.
LEONARD ED., 2013).
23 IRRIGATION IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN ASIA IN FIGURES – AQUASTAT
SURVEY 37, 135, (FAO Water Report, 2011).
24 Muhammad Zafar Khan & Ghulam Akbar, In the Indus Delta it is No
More the Mighty Indus, in, RIVER CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 69, 69
(Philip J. Boon & Paul J. Raven eds., 2012).
25 Mohammad Ashraf Choudhary et al., Prospects of No-Till Wheat in
Rotation with Rice or Cotton in Central and South Asia, in, CONSERVATION
TILLAGE: A VIABLE OPTION FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN EURASIA,
125, 127 (M. Karabayev et al. eds., 2000).
26 Id.
27 Muhammad Shahbaz et al., Effect of Financial Development on
Agricultural Growth in Pakistan: New Extensions from Bounds Test to Level
Relationships and Granger Causality Tests, 40 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 708 (2011),
20
21
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shortfall of water for agricultural sector in Pakistan.28
Moreover, the quality of groundwater is unsatisfactory for
irrigating crops due to the presence of certain elements that
are considered harmful for soil fertility.29 Therefore, to
depend less on groundwater, more attention should be
given to extracting as much river water as possible for
irrigating crops, meaning a greater intensification of demand
for Indus water in Pakistan.
B. EXISTING WATER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
INDUS BASIN IN PAKISTAN

IN THE

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan is largely dependent
on the Indus Basin for water for agriculture and other
sectors, and to meet these needs, several canals—forty-three
to be exact—draw water from the Indus River and its
tributaries.30 These canals irrigate most agricultural land in
the country.31 In addition to the canals, barrages have also

The 36.9 MAF is equal to the current 21.81 MAF shortfall plus 15.1
MAF increase in net crop water requirement. See Hassan, supra note 18,
at 5.
29
Sanval Nasim & Steven Helfand, OPTIMAL GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN’S INDUS WATER BASIN, 1 (Int’l Food Pol’y Res.
Inst., Working Paper No. 034, 2015); see also TUSHAAR SHAH, ET AL.,
IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA: COMPARING NOTES ON
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 8 (Int’l Water Mgmt. Inst., Working Paper No.
4, 2000) [hereinafter Shah et. al.].
30 See ASAD SARWAR QURESHI, HUGH TURRAL, AND ILYAS MASIH,
STRATEGIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CONJUNCTIVE USE OF SURFACE
WATER AND GROUNDWATER RESOURCES IN SEMI-ARID AREAS: A CASE
STUDY FROM PAKISTAN, 1 (2004) [hereinafter Qureshi et. al.].
31 See Sohail J. Malik, et al., Agriculture, Land, and Productivity in Pakistan,
in AGRICULTURE AND THE RURAL ECONOMY IN PAKISTAN: ISSUES,
28
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been constructed in certain regions to use the water of the
Indus Basin.32 On the Indus River alone there are fifteen
barrages used for irrigation.33 The canals and barrages make
Pakistan’s irrigation system one of the largest in the world.34
Approximately, 0.58 million tube-wells have been
installed in the agrarian regions for irrigating crops from
using the ground water.35 On the other hand, in certain
regions that have a scarcity of water and have no tube-wells
installed due to meager electricity available for running
them, the Karez system is used for extracting groundwater.36
The system has been commonly used for several decades in
these regions, prominently in Baluchistan, to meet irrigationrelated needs.37 Though the system uses groundwater
resources for irrigation, but the method is sustainable as

OUTLOOKS, AND POLICY PRIORITIES 41, 47 tbl.2.4 (David J. Spielman et al.
eds., 2016).
32 See NIRMAL TEJ SINGH, IRRIGATION AND SOIL SALINITY IN THE INDIAN
SUBCONTINENT: PAST AND PRESENT, 112 (2005).
33 David Michel, Managing the Indus in a Warming World: The Potential for
Transboundary Cooperation in Coping with Climate Change, in, IMAGINING
INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 91, 99
(Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016).
34 MEHMOOD UL HASSAN & PRACHANDA PRADHAN, COORDINATED
SERVICES FOR IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN PAKISTAN 84 (Int’l Irrigation
Mgmt. Inst., Research Report No. 71, 1998); see also Nasim Akhtar, The
Use of Irrigation Systems for Sustainable Fish Production in Pakistan, in,
FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FISHERIES IN
IRRIGATION SYSTEMS OF ARID ASIA 17, 19 (Tomi Petr ed., 2003).
35 See Shah et al., supra note 29, at 7-8.
36 SHAHID AHMAD ET AL., DROUGHT MITIGATION IN PAKISTAN: CURRENT
STATUS AND OPTIONS FOR FUTURE STRATEGIES 35 (Int’l Water Mgmt. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 85, 2004) [hereinafter Ahmad et at.].
37 Id.; see also ASAD SARWAR QURESHI & MUJEEB AKHTAR, ANALYSIS OF
DROUGHT COPING STRATEGIES IN BALUCHISTAN AND SINDH PROVINCES OF
PAKISTAN, 23 (Int’l Water Mgmt. Inst., Working Paper No. 86, 2004).
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compared to the modern techniques of extracting ground
water for irrigation, because it can be adopted by poor
farmers as well.38 Therefore, most regions in Baluchistan are
reliant on this system to irrigate their agricultural land.39
Pertinently, the Karez system is also considered one of the
oldest irrigation systems in the world,40 and this system has
been considered inductive to sustainable development.41
This shows that water management practices in Pakistan
have historically been sustainable and efficient.
Furthermore, there are also three large dams, and
several small ones, operational in Pakistan.42 The major
dams are Tarbela, Mangla, and the Chashma, which
originally had storage capacities of 9 MAF, 6 MAF, and 0.8
MAF, respectively,43 implying a total storage capacity of
around 15.8 MAF.44 However, this storage capacity is falling
each year due to sedimentation and therefore, the three
major dams now collectively store around 13.1 MAF of the
annual flow of Pakistan’s rivers.45 The stored water is mostly
used for hydropower generation.46 More than one third of

Ahmad et al., supra note 36, at 35.
Id.
40 Id., at 13.
41 See id.
42 Michel, supra note 33, at 91, 99.
43 See Shahid Amjad Chaudhry, Pakistan’s Indus Basin Water Strategy: Past,
Present and Future, in, PAKISTAN: MOVING THE ECONOMY FORWARD, 200
(Rashid Amjad and Shahid Javed Burki eds., 2015).
44 See Water Sustainability in Pakistan, BUSINESS RECORDER, (October 15,
2017), https://fp.brecorder.com/2017/10/20171015226410/.
45 Id.
46 See Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing, Introduction, in, IMAGINING
INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 3, 11
(Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016). [hereinafter Wirsing &
Adeel].
38
39
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the country’s electricity demand is met by the hydropower
generated by these dams.47
The government of Pakistan has also started
implementing its plans to construct new water storage
projects on the Indus River and its tributaries.48 Work has
already begun on the Neelum and Jhelum Rivers via the
Neelum–Jhelum water project, and on the Indus River via
the Diamir Bhasha Dam.49 Once completed, these dams will
provide sufficient amount of electricity into the national
power grid. For example, the Neelum–Jhelum and Diamir
Bhasha Dam power projects will have the capacity to
produce 969 megawatts (“MW”) and 4,500 MW of electricity,
respectively.50 Together, these dams will be able to generate
5,469 MW of electricity, enough to meet the current shortfall
of electricity, which is around 5,000 MW.51

See id.
ROCKIN TH. SINGH, INDIA’S WATER RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS,
233 (Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2011).
49 See IMF, Pakistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II 126 tbl.7.6 (2010)
(Country Report No.10/183); see also Hashim et al., Project-distribution
Planning in Supply Chain Management under Fuzzy Environment for Largescale Hydropower Construction Projects, in, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT: FOCUSED ON ELECTRICAL AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, 569 (Jiuping Xu, Masoom Yasinzai, & Benjamin Lev, 2012);
see BOGUMIL TERMINSKI, DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND
RESETTLEMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOCIO-LEGAL CONTEXT 98
(2014).
50 1 INT’L BUS. PUBL’NS USA, PAKISTAN ENERGY POLICY, LAWS AND
REGULATIONS HANDBOOK: STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND BASIC LAWS 78
(2015).
51 Id. at 76; Khalid Hasnain, Electricity Shortfall Soars to 5,000MW, DAWN
(April 16, 2017), www.dawn.com/news/1327253/electricity-shortfallsoars-to-5000mw.
47
48
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In addition to rivers and dams, there are several manmade and natural lakes in Pakistan. The water in these lakes
is used for domestic purposes, such as drinking and
irrigation by the locals residing near such lakes, particularly
in the region of Baluchistan, which Indus water does not
reach.52 These lakes store small amounts of water, which are
intensified when there is high rainfall in these regions.53 Of
these lakes, the Manchar Lake, located in Sindh province, is
the largest lake in Pakistan.54 The area of Manchar Lake
fluctuates with rainfall; in rainy seasons, the water of the
lake covers a land area of around 520 square kilometers,
while in drier seasons the water covers only 350 square
kilometers.55 Nonetheless, the lake is sufficient to meet the
water-related needs of the local population for drinking,
domestic, and agrarian purposes.56
C. DOMESTIC LAWS & POLICIES FOR
MANAGEMENT & PREVENTION OF FLOODS

WATER

There are several federal and provincial laws in
Pakistan related to the management of water resources,
prevention of floods, and mitigation of adverse effects in the
event of abnormal increases or decreases in river

MUKHTAR AHMED, ANCIENT PAKISTAN – AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL HISTORY:
HARAPPAN CIVILIZATION – THE MATERIAL CULTURE, 250 (2014)
[hereinafter M Ahmed].
53 Id.
54 MARC TYLER NOBLEMAN, PAKISTAN, 13 (2003).
55 See generally Manchar Lake, SINDH TIMES (December 29, 2016),
http://www.thesindhtimes.com/travel/manchar-lake-2.
56 See M. AHMED, supra note 52, at 250.
52
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watercourses.57 These laws also regulate and supervise
national flood management policy. Some of these laws
predate the state of Pakistan, as the laws were enacted
during British colonial rule.58 These include the NWFP Act
of 1873¸ the NWFP Canal and Drainage Act of 1873, the
Sindh Irrigation Act of 1879, the Punjab Canal and Drainage
Act of 1873, and the Punjab Irrigation Act of 1873.59
Since partition, additional laws have been enacted in
Pakistan, such as the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act 1952, the
Water And Power Development Authority (“WAPDA”) Act
1958, the Baluchistan Ordinance 1980, the Water Users
Association Ordinances 1981, the Indus River System
Authority (“IRSA”) Act 1992, the Provincial Irrigation and
Drainage Authority (“PIDA”) Act 1997, and the
Environment Protection Act 1997.60 These statutes are
intended to manage surplus water as well as to avoid losses
during floods.61 Moreover, these laws also provide relief and
assistance to people in flood-affected regions.62
In addition to these laws, the Emergency Relief Cells
(ERC) and the Provincial Relief Department have been
established for dealing with the flood-related emergencies.63
The former has the role of coordinating between the Federal
divisions and Provincial governments as well as among the
semi-governmental and international and national agencies

SIMI KAMAL, ET AL., DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED RIVER BASIN
MANAGEMENT (IRBM) FOR INDUS BASIN,: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 43 (2012) [hereinafter Kamal, et al.].
58 See id.
59 Id., at 6, 13.
60 Id., at 43.
61 See id.
62 Id.
63 Id., at 45.
57
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for emergency relief related operations.64 On the other hand,
the latter is controlled by the Relief Commissioner who
establishes coordination among relevant provincial entities
for meeting the emergency relief requirements.65
Furthermore, a separate government organization, the
National Disaster Management Authority (“NDMA”), works
to mitigate and prevent the adverse impacts of natural
disasters, such as floods and droughts, in affected areas.66
The NDMA provides relief and support to people recovering
from flood or droughts.67
Although, there are laws and several organizations
functioning to manage the distribution of water in Pakistan,
but an exact framework or regulation for managing water
distribution in an efficient manner is lacking in the country.68
In particular, there is no particular flood management policy
in Pakistan; rather, the aforementioned laws indirectly
provide some provisions for flood management.69
Pertinently, the existing flood management has relied upon
the adoption of structural measures for preventing floods.70
For instance, the construction of flood walls, embankments,
spurs, diversion structures and bypass structures, etc. have
been adopted as some methods of preventing floods.71 In

Id.
See id., at 46-7 (The success of the aforementioned organizations and
entities is arguable as some consider them as a failure due to the massive
damages occurred during the 1954, 1973, and 1975 flood).
66 See PAK. MINISTRY OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL DISASTER
MANAGEMENT PLAN – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 2 (2012).
67 See id., at 13 tbls. 12-13.
68 See Kamal et al., supra note 57, at 18.
69 Id., at 43.
70 Id.
71 Id.
64
65
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this regard, the construction of embankments is being
particularly followed, as the embankments along all the
major rivers have been constructed.72 Thus, the structural
measures are implemented for flood management in
Pakistan, while the existing laws do not provide a
unanimous framework or legal policy for flood
management.73
D. REDUCTION IN AVERAGE ANNUAL FLOW OF WATER IN
THE INDUS BASIN
In Pakistan, the average annual flow of river waters is
approximately 143 MAF.74 More than 80 percent of this
quantity of water, i.e. 114.4 MAF,75 arrives at the river basins
due to the melting of glaciers during the summer season.76
Data on the average flow of river waters indicates that the
availability of water in the major Indus River tributaries has
decreased substantially since 1961.77 For instance, the

Id.
Id.
74 See Ahmad, supra note 18, at 5.
75 This quantity can be calculated by multiplying 0.80 with 143 (Hint:
simple mathematical formula has been used for calculating the 80% of
143 MAF i.e. percentage multiplied by the total quantity).
76 See Climate Change Risk Profile – Pakistan, Climate Change
Adaptation, by Thought Leadership and Assessments (ATLAS) Task
Order No. AID-OAA-I-14-00013 – USAID, March 2017, at 3,
https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/201
7_USAID_Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Profile_Pakistan.pdf; see also
Sh. Mushtaq Ahmed, The water picture of Pakistan, THE NATION, (February
14,
2017),
http://nation.com.pk/14-Feb-2017/the-water-picture-ofpakistan [hereinafter Sh. Ahmed].
77 See IRSHAD AHMAD, ALLAH BAKHSH SUFI, & IMRAN TARIQ, WATER
RESOURCES OF PAKISTAN 101 (Pakistan Engineering Congress Paper No.
72
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average annual flow in the Indus River was 93 MAF in
1961,78 but this amount has now fallen to approximately 89
MAF.79
Similarly, in the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, the
average annual flow of water was 23 MAF and 26 MAF in
1961,80 which has decreased to 22 MAF and 25 MAF,
respectively.81 Pertinently, the reduction in the average flow
of water in these rivers could be the result of construction of
hydropower projects on these rivers by India within its
territory, which store a substantial amount of water of the
Indus River tributaries, which reduces the flow of water in
the Pakistani western rivers.82
In addition to the Indus River and its tributaries,
which flow from India to Pakistan, the Kabul River, which
flows from Afghanistan, has also faced a substantial
reduction of its average flow of water from 26 MAF in 1961
to 18.9 MAF in 2000 and 17.4 MAF in 2010.83 The decrease in
the average annual flow of water in these rivers has also

711, 2012), [hereinafter Tariq et. el.]; see also ALLAH BAKHSH SUFI ET. AL.,
INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN, 37 (Pakistan
Engineering Congress Paper No. 286, 2009-10) [hereinafter Sufi et. al.].
78 See Tariq et. al., supra note 77, at 101; See also Sufi et. al., supra note 77,
at 37.
79 See Sh. Ahmed, supra note 76. (Note: The 89 MAF includes the quantity
of Kabul River 17 MAF. If we subtract this from 89 MAF, then we will
get 72 MAF, which shows the significant amount of reduction in the
average annual flow of the Indus River).
80 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 37 tbl. 1.
81 See Sh. Ahmed, supra note 76.
82See SHAHEEN AKHTAR, EMERGING CHALLENGES TO INDUS WATERS
TREATY: ISSUES OF COMPLIANCE & TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS OF INDIAN
HYDROPROJECTS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS, 59 (Institute of Regional
Studies, 2010) [hereinafter Akhtar].
83 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 37 tbl. 1.
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resulted in an overall decrease of the total availability and
net average flow of river water in Pakistan, from 189 MAF in
1961 to 138 MAF in 2009-10.84 At present, the total average
annual flow is 143 MAF,85 which is way lower than the flow
of 189 MAF in 1961.86
The per capita availability of water has also decreased
substantially. In 1960 this was around 4,000 cubic meters.87
However, this amount fell to 2,100 cubic meters in 1981,
1,600 cubic meters in 1991, and 1,078 cubic meters in 2001.88
The amount of water recorded in 2010 was 1,050 cubic
meters, and this is expected to fall to 877 cubic meters by
2020.89 Moreover, Pakistan’s population is increasing
rapidly, which is also putting a strain on per capita water
usage.90 The population in 1961 was 46 million, and it has
now passed 180 million.91 In 2020, it is expected to go
beyond 200 million.92 This has increased per person demand
for water, but has substantially decreased the per person
availability of water from 3,950 cubic meters in 1961 to less
than 1,000 cubic meters93 at present; this has made Pakistan a

See id.
See Hassan, supra note 18, at 3.
86 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 37 tbl. 1.
87 Bashir Ahmad, Water Management: A Solution to Water Scarcity in
Pakistan, 114, 9 J. Ind. Stud. Res. - Msse, 111, 114 (2011) [hereinafter
Ahmad].
88 Id.
89 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 41.
90 See Ahmad, supra note 87, at 114.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
84
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“water-stressed”94 region. This suggests that immense
pressure on available water resources is being felt in
Pakistan. Furthermore, by 2025 it is expected that water
availability will fall below the 700-cubic meter threshold,
which will mark Pakistan as a “water-scarce”95 country.96
The WWF 2012 Report on water management in Pakistan
suggested that Pakistan would reach water scarcity in 2035,97
but current data indicates that Pakistan will reach that level
fifteen years earlier, in 2020.98 This further illustrates the
swift pace of water shortage that is occurring in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, the storage capacities of the major
dams in Pakistan have also fallen significantly in recent
years. For instance, the Tarbela Dam was completed in 1976
and had around 9.68 MAF of total water storage capacity at
that time; this fell to 6.78 MAF in 2009 and 6.5 MAF in
2012.99 This indicates a total loss of storage capacity of
around 3.18 MAF in the Tarbela Dam, which is expected to
reach 4.30 MAF, to a storage capacity of 5.38 MAF, by
2025.100 The situation is similar for the Mangla Dam, which
had a total capacity of around 5.34 MAF when it was
completed in 1967 but over time its storage capacity has
declined substantially.101 The total storage capacity of

Water stress is denoted for a region that has per capita availability of
water from 1,000 cubic meters to 1,666.7 cubic meters. See Akhtar, supra
note 82, at 10.
95 See Akhtar, supra note 82 at 8. Water scarce regions have per capita
availability of water of less than 1,000 cubic meters.; Id., at 10.
96 See Id. at 8; See also Sufi et al., supra note 17, at 41.
97 Kamal et al., supra note 57 at 5.
98 See Ahmad, supra note 87, at 114; see also Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 41.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 38; see also Sh. Ahmed, supra note 76.
94
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Mangla, Tarbela, and Chashma has fallen from 16 MAF to
14.2 MAF.102 Such significant decrease of the storage
capacities of the major dams points toward the need for the
government to take measures either to increase the storage
capacities of these dams by proper maintenance or to
construct new water storage dams that could store large
amounts of water resources for the future to minimize the
substantial annual losses of water. Furthermore, the total
storage capacities of the major dams, the Tarbela, Mangla,
and Chashma, are equivalent to 9.8 percent of the total
average annual flow of river waters in Pakistan.103 This
further shows that there is a meager availability of stored
water in the country.
Owing to the insufficient availability of water in the
near future, agricultural production is likely to decline.104
This can create negative effects for the economy and GDP
because agricultural production constitutes approximately
25 percent of national GDP.105 Furthermore, the water stored
in Pakistan’s major dams is primarily used for electricity
generation.106 A large number of manufacturing firms and
private businesses rely on this electricity for the functioning
of their machinery. The absence of water for the Tarbela and

See Sh. Ahmed, supra note 76. (Although, the total storage capacity of
the three dams is 11.2 MAF, but recently the Govt. has upgraded the
Mangla dam, which has taken the total storage capacity to 14.15 MAF.)
103 Id., at 1. This can be achieved by calculating the percentage of 14.15
MAF to the total average annual flow of 143 MAF. (The Govt. of Pak has
made some efforts to increase the 11.4 MAF storage capacity level. The
upgrading of the Mangla dam has taken the total storage capacity from
11.4 MAF to 14.15 MAF).
104 See Qureshi et al., supra note 30, at 1.
105 See Choudhary et. al, supra note 25 at 127.
106 IBP, INC., PAKISTAN: DOING BUSINESS AND INVESTING IN PAKISTAN, 87
(Int’l. Bus. Pub., USA, 2015).
102
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Mangla Dams can result in shortages of hydropower, which
will intensify the ongoing load-shedding in the country and
will threaten the manufacturing sector in Pakistan.107
Persistent load-shedding for longer hours every day can
induce foreign investors to withdraw their investment from
Pakistan in favor of some other country where there is less
load-shedding, resulting not only in substantial capital flight
but also the closure of several businesses, eventually raising
unemployment and discouraging investors from making
new investment in the country.108
Furthermore, owing to a significant reduction in
overall production caused by the shutdown of
manufacturing firms, GDP will also decline, which is a bad
sign for the national economy.109 Hence, the shortage of
water has far-reaching impacts on the economy, making
Pakistan vulnerable to changes in the flow of water in its
transboundary rivers. This further indicates an immediate
need to deal with the factors reducing the availability of
water in the rivers and negatively affecting current water
management practices in the country.

Christine Kessides, A Review of Infrastructure's Impact on Economic
Development, in, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, 216 (David F. Batten & Charlie Karlsson eds., 1996); see
also CHRISTINE KESSIDES, THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INFRASTRUCTURE TO
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS, 10 (World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 213, 1993).
108 See generally M. Asif, The Energy Crises, DAWN, (September 3, 2017),
https://www.dawn.com/news/1326795.
109 Id.
107
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Certain factors affect current water management
practices in Pakistan and disturb average annual water
supply in the rivers. The prominent factors are Indian water
storage projects and adverse, unexpected climate change,
which cause abnormal increases or decreases in annual
rainfall.
1. INDIAN WATER STORAGE PROJECTS
India has started constructing mass water storage
dams over the western rivers, which were allocated to
Pakistan by the Indus Waters Treaty. For instance, on the
Chenab River, India has built eleven dams, among which the
major dams are the Baglihar and Salal Dams.110 In addition,
India has also completed several hydropower projects on the
Chenab River, which include the Bichari, Bursar, Karwar,
Kirthi, Kiru, Gypsa, Naunat, Pakwal Dul, Ratle, Seli,
Shamnot, and Raoli.111 The Bursar project is the largest
producer of electricity, 1,020 MW, and Pakwal is producing
1,000 MW.112 The smallest production is the 104 MW
produced by the Bichari project.113 On a similar note, on the
Indus River India has constructed nine hydropower
projects.114 Similarly, on the Jhelum River there are thirteen
hydropower generation projects built by India, including the

See Akhtar, supra note 82, at 10.
Id., at 28.
112 Id.
113 Id., at 28–29.
114 Id.
110
111

2017

INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT

85

notorious Kishanganga Dam, which has a capacity to
substantially divert the water of the Neelum–Jhelum River
in Kashmir, leaving the Neelum Valley of Pakistan
completely deserted.115
Notably, Pakistan has raised objections to twentyseven Indian water projects.116 The most prominent of these
have been the Baglihar Dam, the Salal project, the Dul Hasti
power project, the Wullar Barrage, and Kishanganga Dam.117
We will discuss the issues pertaining to the Kishanganga
Dam and the Wullar Barrage in this paper.
According to official statements by Pakistan’s former
Indus Waters Commissioner, Jamaat Ali Shah, these
hydropower projects have the capacity to obstruct around 43
million cubic meters of river water from entering Pakistan.118
That is why the construction of these dams and hydropower
projects by India over the western rivers is worrying the
already water-stressed Pakistan, which is rapidly heading
toward becoming a water-scarce country.119
Pertinently, the construction of these Indian water
projects has already resulted in a substantial decrease in the
average annual flow of water in the rivers in Pakistan. For
instance, the water flow in the Chenab River has decreased
to 6,000 cusecs from its average level of 10,000 cusecs,
because India has initiated almost a dozen water storage
projects on the river.120 The construction of the Baglihar Dam

Id., at 29.
Id., at 15.
117 See AIR MARSHAL VINOD PATNEY, ASIAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2014–2015
(KW Pub. Pvt. Ltd., 2015).
118 See Akhtar, supra note 82, at 30.
119 Id.
120 Abdul Rauf Iqbal, Water Shortage in Pakistan – A Crisis around the
Corner, 2 ISSRA PAPERS 1, 9 (2010).
115
116
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by India was the most harmful to Pakistan, resulting in
blocking a substantial flow of water to the Chenab River. For
instance, on October 9 and 11, 2009, the Chenab River
received 19,351 cusecs and 10,700 cusecs per day,
respectively, despite being expected to receive around 55,000
cusecs.121 In the event of a complete blockage of water from
India to the Chenab River contrary to the Indus Waters
Treaty, more than 400 canals and more than a thousand of its
tributaries will have no water to irrigate the 7.35 million
acres of agricultural land in Pakistan.122
a) KISHANGANGA DAM
The Kishanganga Dam constitutes significant harm to
Pakistan owing to its controversial design.123 The dam is
being constructed by India on the run of the Neelum and
Jhelum Rivers in Kashmir.124 The Neelum River meets with
the Jhelum River in the Muzaffarabad region of Azad
Kashmir, inside Pakistani territory.125 However, India wants
the Neelum River to meet the Jhelum River inside territory it
controls, in Jammu and Kashmir, by diverting the major
stream of the Neelum River away from Muzaffarabad and
toward Jammu and Kashmir through its Kishanganga
project.126 This can literally dry out the naturally beautiful

Id., at 10.
Id., at 9-10.
123 See F. Naz, Water: A Cause of Power Politics in South Asia, in, WATER
AND SOCIETY II, 105 (C.A. Brebbia ed., 2014).
124 Id.
125 MARTINA NICOLLS, KASHMIR ON A KNIFE-EDGE 18 (Strategic Book
Publishing, 2010).
126See Kishanganga Dam — Another Set of Failed Water Talks, DAWN,
(December 05, 2005), https://www.dawn.com/news/168442.
121
122
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Neelum Valley in Pakistan because the main source of water
for this valley is the Neelum River, which will not reach
there adequately if India is successful in diverting it toward
its Jammu valley.127 Consequently, in the event of low
rainfall in the Neelum Valley the area can face drought.
Furthermore, the meeting of the Neelum River with the
Jhelum River in Jammu can give leverage to India in
controlling the amount of flow of the Jhelum River toward
Pakistan.128 It can use this leverage during any conflict or
war in order to negotiate with Pakistan on its own terms.
b) WULLAR BARRAGE
India aims to construct the Wullar Barrage on the
Jhelum River. It will have a water storage capacity of 0.30
MAF, which is several times higher than allowed by the
Indus Waters Treaty,129 which permits India to store 0.2
MAF in a barrage over the Jhelum River for nonconsumptive use.130 This indicates a clear violation on the
part of India in complying with the maximum amount of
water to be stored for non-consumptive use.131 Moreover,
India would be able to control the flow of water of the
Jhelum River to Pakistan through the Wullar Barrage at any

AK CHATURVEDI, WATER: A SOURCE FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS, 169 (Vij
Books India Pvt Ltd, 2013).
128 CHRISTINA LEB, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES, 417 (Edward Elgar Pub., 2013) [hereinafter: Leb
et al.].
129 See Akhtar, supra note 82 at 32.
130 See The Indus Waters Treaty, Ind.- Pak., art. III, ¶ 7, Sept. 19, 1960, 419
U.N.T.S.
131 See Akhtar, supra note 82, at 31-34 (discussing the Pakistani stance
regarding the Wullar Barrage).
127
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time it chooses. The Wullar Barrage will use the water of the
Wullar Lake, which is a major source of water for the
Mangla Dam.132
Hence, according to Pakistan, the Wullar Barrage and
Kishanganga Dam give considerable leverage to India in
controlling the water flow of the Jhelum River. Pakistan has
expressed its fears relating to the Wullar Barrage that India
can either obstruct or inundate the Jhelum River basin in
Pakistan through blocking or opening the spillways of these
projects.133 If the reservations of Pakistan are true, this
implies that these dams have the potential to cause
significant harm to Pakistan, which is against the true spirit
of the Indus Waters Treaty.134
As the Indian water storage projects have the
potential to adversely affect water flows in the Pakistani
rivers, they can also cause adverse effects to agriculture and,
consequently, an overall reduction in crop production.135
Any damaging impact on agriculture will also result in
hostile consequences for the economy.136 Therefore, certain
Indian water storage projects are a direct threat to the
agrarian economy of Pakistan. Importantly, they are also
harming current water management facilities in Pakistan by

Id.
Id.
134 See Naz, supra note 123, at 105.
135 See Han Dorussen et al., Any Ties that Bind? Economic Diplomacy on the
Sourth Asian Subcontinent, in, ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 164 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 2011); see also Ahmed
Abukhater, Introduction, in, WATER AS A CATALYST FOR PEACE:
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 13
(Routledge, 2013).
136 See JAVERIA NIAZI, COST OF FLOODS ON PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY 14
(Anchor Academic Pub., 2013) (discussing the historic adverse effects on
Pakistan’s agriculture).
132
133
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reducing the availability of water.137 Nonetheless, India has
never paid attention to Pakistan’s concerns and repeated
complaints.138
2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND RAINFALL
Climate change affects water management practices
to a great extent in every region.139 For instance, a substantial
decrease in rainfall can create a shortage of water in rivers,
canals, barrages, and other water management facilities.
Moreover, a complete absence of rainfall for a longer time
can also create drought.140 Hence, in Pakistan, areas with
low rainfall are more vulnerable to climate change.141 The
government’s administrative bodies have made ponds and
small lakes for storing water in low-rainfall areas. These
lakes and ponds are, sometimes, the only water management
facilities available to residents in the event of low rainfall.
However, with adverse climate change resulting in

See Wirsing & Adeel, supra note 46, at 42.
See ARIEL DINAR ET AL., BRIDGES OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION, AND COOPERATION,
332 (World Scientific Pub. Co. Inc., 2013) (discussing India’s rejection of
Pakistan’s concerns related to Baglihar dam) [hereinafter Dinar et al.].
139 NAT’L SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, SCI. ASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CHANGE ON THE U.S. 154 (A report of the Committee
on Environment and Natural Resources, 2009); see also SAEID ESLAMIAN,
HANDBOOK OF ENGINEERING HYDROLOGY: MODELING, CLIMATE CHANGE,
AND VARIABILITY 119 (CRC Press, 2014).
140 Nasim Sanval & Steven Helfand, Optimal Groundwater Management in
Pakistan’s Indus Water Basin 22 INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST. (WORKING
PAPER NO. 034, 2016).
141 See ASAF SARWAR QURESHI, RASHIDA MAJEED, MOHAMMAD SALEEM,
SHAHID AHMAD, & ZAHID HUSSAIN, DROUGHT MITIGATION IN PAKISTAN:
CURRENT STATUS AND OPTIONS FOR FUTURE STRATEGIES, 17 (IWMI, 2004).
137
138
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droughts, these lakes and ponds become dried up. For
example, during the recent drought in Tharparkar and Dadu
in Sindh province, the available water resources in these
regions became dried up, which caused a significant water
shortage.142
On the other hand, sometimes climate change also
results in an abnormal increase in rainfall during the
monsoon season, which results in amassing the flow of
water in the river basins in India and in Pakistan.143
Monsoons occur during the summer season, when the
melting of Himalayan glaciers takes place, which generates
large flows of water that run into the Indus river basin. This
melted water combines with rain water during high
monsoon rainfalls.144 Consequently, India also discharges a
large amount of water to Pakistani rivers to protect its own
land from flooding. This sometimes results in increasing the
water level in the Indus Basin beyond a sustainable level.145
Such a situation eventually results in the flooding of the
basin’s nearby regions in Pakistan.146 The flood level
becomes more dangerous if the amount of water discharged
by India into the river basins during these situations is high
and beyond the storage capacities of the river beds and
canals in Pakistan. There have been several floods in the

Id.
POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH AND ANALYTICS,
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND THE
CASE FOR RESILIENCE 128 (World Bank Publications, 2013).
144 Asif Inam et al., The Geographic, Geological, and Oceanographic Setting of
the Indus River, in, LARGE RIVERS: GEOMORPHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT,
333 (Avijit Gupta, Wiley & Sons, 2008).
145 JAMES CLARKE ET AL., ON TARGET FOR PEOPLE AND PLANET, 36 (IWMI,
2014).
146 Id.
142
143
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country when a high amount of water was drained by India
into the rivers in Pakistan; this quantity was higher than
usually discharged by India during other years and
consequently beyond what could be accommodated by the
river basins in Pakistan. The floods in the 1970s, 1988, 1992,
and 2010 were damaging for crops and for the residents of
the flood-hit areas.147
Prominently, in a recent example, the flood in July
2010 caused irreparable damage to the agriculture and
economy of Pakistan by devastating the crops and houses of
local people in the flood-affected areas.148 The 2010 flood
directly affected an estimated twenty million people. More
than 2,000 people died and the homes of 1.6 million people
were destroyed by the flood,149 while crops were devastated
over a large area. The damage to the livestock sector was
estimated at 48 billion PKR (457 million USD).150 The total
monetary value of the damage by the flood was estimated to
be 9.8 billion USD, around six percent of GDP.151

Shahid Hassan Rizvi & Syed Iazaz Ahmad Bukhari, Impact of 2010
Floods on Pakistan’s Agriculture, 1 J. ENVIRON. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY
(2017) [hereinafter: Rizvi & Bukhari].
148 Patrick Daly, Cycles of Destruction and Reconstruction: Responding to
Disasters in Asia, in, REBUILDING ASIA FOLLOWING NATURAL DISASTERS:
APPROACHES TO RECONSTRUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 18
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016); see also Pervaiz Amir, Institutional and
Technical Innovation in Pakistan for Resilience to Extreme Climate Events, in,
RETHINKING RESILIENCE, ADAPTATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN A TIME OF
CHANGE 130 (Wanglin Yan & Will Galloway ed., Springer, 2017).
149 Muhammad Zafar Khan & Ghulam Akbar, In the Indus Delta it is No
More the Mighty Indus, in, RIVER CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT, 75
(Paul Raven & Philip Boon, ed., Wiley & Sons, 2012).
150 Rizvi & Bukhari, supra note 147, at 1.
151 See SARAH HOUSE, EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW: PAKISTAN FLOOD RESPONSE
2011/12 4 (Oxfam, 2012).
147

92

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 25

Such floods cause damage to the existing water
management facilities in the country. They sometimes result
in collapses of barrages and dams. Moreover, the irrigation
system also suffers considerable damage. This demonstrates
the adverse effects that abnormal changes in climate can
cause on water management practices.
3. INCREASE IN COSTS FOR COMPLETION OF WATER
MANAGEMENT WORKS
Certain Indian projects have resulted in increases of
the cost of some of the Pakistani water management works.
This is because India has also started constructing water
storage works on the same river streams as those on which
Pakistan had already announced the construction of their
new dams. For instance, Pakistan announced the Neelum–
Jhelum power project in the last decade.152 Soon after that,
India announced its plan to build the Kishanganga Dam on
the Neelum and Jhelum rivers. Both nations have made
counterclaims of early announcing and starting their
projects.153
Pakistan made objections to the Kishanganga Dam as
it deemed that the dam would have the potential to
significantly disturb the flow of water in the Jhelum and

Bids for the project were invited in May 2005, while the work was
started in February 2008. See Government Urged to Extend Deadline for Bids:
Neelum–Jhelum Hydropower Project, DAWN, (May 23, 2005),
https://www.dawn.com/news/140397; see also Musharraf opens Neelum–
Jhelum power project today, THE NEWS INT’L (February 9, 2008),
https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/94668-musharraf-opensNeelum–Jhelum-power-project-today.
153 See Leb et al., supra note 128, at 417.
152

2017

INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT

93

Neelum Rivers,154 which will consequently affect the flow of
Neelum–Jhelum river water reaching the Neelum–Jhelum
power project.155 In such a situation, the functionality of the
project would be questionable. Therefore, it led Pakistan to
reconsider completing the Neelum–Jhelum project, which
not only caused a delay in the completion of the first phase
of the dam but also increased the cost of the dam to at least
three times the originally perceived cost.156
India did not address the concerns of Pakistan
regarding the Kishanganga Dam, which compelled Pakistan
to file a case against India in the International Court of
Arbitration.157 The final verdict required India to make
certain changes in the design of the dam, but it also allowed
India to continue constructing it.158 The completion of the
Kishanganga Dam is not favorable to Pakistan,159 so Pakistan
has decided to not follow the prior-appropriation rule,

Id.; see also DHIRENDRA K. VAJPEYI, WATER RESOURCE CONFLICTS AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 124 (Lexington Books,
2012).
155 See Chaturvedi, supra note 127, at 169.
156 See generally Neelum–Jhelum Hydropower Project Will be Operational Next
Year:
WAPDA,
EXPRESS
TRIBUNE,
(February,
15,
2017),
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1327443/Neelum–Jhelum-hydropowerproject-will-operational-next-year-wapda-chairman,-[hereinafter
WADA].
157 See Wirsing & Adeel, supra note 46, at 40.
158 Although the court initially ordered India to cease the construction of
the Kishanganga Dam when Pakistan appealed, it gave its final decision
in December 2013 when it allowed India to continue constructing the
Kishanganga Dam. See GUSTAF OLSSON, WATER AND ENERGY: THREATS
AND OPPORTUNITIES, 19 (IWA Publishing, 2015).
159 See Bjorn-Oliver Magsig, The Indus Waters Treaty: Modernizing the
Normative Pillars to Build a More Resilient Future, in, Imagining Industan:
Overcoming Water Insecurity In The Indus Basin 69, 79 (Zafar Adeel &
Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016).
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which argues the party that first uses a watercourse is
considered the rightful owner of that water resource.160
Hence, if Pakistan is able to complete the Neelum–Jhelum
power project before India’s completion of the Kishanganga
Dam, Pakistan will be considered the rightful owner of the
Neelum and Jhelum River streams, on which both of these
projects are being pursued. Nonetheless, it would induce
Pakistan to make certain changes to the Neelum–Jhelum
project to complete it early, having to employ additional
resources for the earlier completion of the project. This
would increase the cost of the dam, which is challenging for
Pakistan because of the financial constraints on the budget of
its development sector.161
Without spending additional money, it is impossible
to complete the dam in time and before India’s completion
of the Kishanganga Dam.162 It can be said India is disturbing
Pakistan’s current and future water management plans and
projects by affecting the water of the western rivers, which
were originally allocated to Pakistan for its unrestricted use.
Hence, in a nutshell, we can conclude from the above
discussion that the overall water-management practices in

Pertinently, both India and Pakistan have opted to follow the Prior
Appropriation Rule related to the Kishanganga project. See Sheila Rai &
Sanghamitra Patnaik, Water Disputes in South Asia, in, WATER RESOURCE
CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 108,
125 (Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi, ed., 2012).
161 Mahendra Lal Patel, Global Monitoring of Food Situation of Indian Tribes,
in, GLOBAL PERCEPTION OF TRIBAL RESEARCH IN INDIA, 28 (Atlantic
Publishers & Dist., 2002).
162 This is because the cost of the dam has already increased, and if
Pakistan employs more resources on the dam then the cost of the new
resources will add up into the existing high costs. See WAPDA, supra
note 156 (offering details about the increase in cost as announced by the
WAPDA chairman).
160
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Pakistan are quite systematic and well structured; however,
external factors such as obstructions in the flow of water by
Indian water-storage projects and abnormal climate change,
which has resulted in substantial increases or decreases in
rainfall, are negatively affecting the flow of water in the
rivers and the water-management system in the country.
III.

INDUS WATERS TREATY & WATER MANAGEMENT
INDUS BASIN

IN THE

The Indus Waters Treaty provides special
recommendations for Indus water management to both
parties to the treaty, India and Pakistan.163 The treaty has
devised a mechanism to distribute the Indus River and its
five tributaries by assigning the three eastern river
tributaries, the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas Rivers, to India and the
three western tributaries, the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus
Rivers, to Pakistan.164 Articles II, III, IV, and VII relate to the
management of Indus water by Pakistan and India.165
A. CONSTRUCTION OF DAMS AND BARRAGES—ARTICLE IV
Article IV of the Indus Waters Treaty provides
guidance on water-management facilities. It recommends

Virginia Hooper & Michael McWilliams, Case Studies of Transboundary
Water Management: Fifteen Initiatives from Various Parts of the World, in,
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 196
(Anton Earle et al. ed., 2013) [hereinafter: Hopper].
164 SIMON MARSDEN, ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES IN ASIAN SUBREGIONS:
CHINA AND THE THIRD POLE (Edward Elgar Pub., 2017). [hereinafter:
Marsden].
165 See Marsden, supra note 164; see also Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak.,
arts. II, III, & IV, Sept 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 6032.
163
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water management practices to Pakistan.166 This article
encourages Pakistan to construct new water-management
facilities over western rivers to eliminate or reduce its
dependence on the eastern rivers.167 The eastern rivers are
allocated to India for unrestricted use.168 Article IV,
Paragraph 1, states:
Pakistan shall use its best endeavors to construct and
bring into operation, with due regard to expedition and
economy, that part of a system of works which will
accomplish the replacement, from the Western Rivers and
other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in
Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on
water supplies from the Eastern Rivers.169
Furthermore, Paragraph 3 of Article IV also
recommends certain water-management schemes related to
drainage, sanitation, preservation of soil from erosion, and
removal of sand from river beds.170 The provision prevents
India and Pakistan from pursuing such water-management
schemes that may cause harm to the other or result in
consumptive use of water in the rivers allotted to the other
state.171 The first point of Paragraph 3 of Article IV
states:[E]ach Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material
damage to the other Party172

Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV, Sept 19, 1960 419 U.N.T.S.
6032.
167 See id.
168 Id.
169 See id. at art IV, ¶ 1.
170 See id. at art IV, ¶ 3.
171 Id.
172 Id.
166
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The treaty also explicitly mentions watermanagement endeavors such as barrages, dams, and
irrigation canals and compels both states to not cause any
harm to the other in pursuing any of the aforementioned
water-management works. Paragraph 9 of Article IV states:
Each Party declares its intention to operate its storage
dams, barrages and irrigation canals in such manner,
consistent with the normal operations of its hydraulic
systems, as to avoid, as far as feasible, material damage to
the other Party.173
However, India’s current use of the western river
tributaries defies this provision of the treaty because India
has constructed several water-storage projects on these
rivers, which have the potential to cause significant harm to
Pakistan by reducing the annual average flow of water in
these rivers.174 As set out in the previous section 1.4, the
average annual flow of these rivers has already fallen in the
last decade, since the initiation of construction of
controversial water-storage projects, that is, the Baglihar
Dam, the Ratle Dam, the Salal and Kishanganga projects,
etc., by India.175 This reduction in the average annual flow of
water presents a threat to the current agricultural
infrastructure in Pakistan, which is heavily reliant on that

Id. at art. IV, ¶ 9.
See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79 (discussing the probable harm that
can be caused to Pakistan by some water management projects of India).
175 Naz, supra note 123, at 105 (describing the damage that the
Kishanganga dam can cause to Pakistan); see Dinar et al., supra note 138,
at 332 (detailing Pakistan’s perceptions related to the likely harm carried
by the Baglihar dam); see Akhtar, supra note 82, at 31-32 (discussing the
harm carried by Wullar Barrage).
173
174

98

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 25

water.176 Thus, water-management facilities in India are
causing significant harm to Pakistan, which further indicates
India is failing to follow the true spirit of the Indus Waters
Treaty.
B. INCREASE IN THE CATCHMENT AREA OF DRAINAGE
BASINS—ARTICLE IV
The fourth paragraph of Article IV of the treaty
provides further guidance to Pakistan for the special case
when Pakistan feels the need to increase the catchment area
of either its river basins or of any natural or artificial
drainage basins that receive water drained by India toward
Pakistan.177 In this regard, Article IV explains that:
[S]hould Pakistan desire to increase the catchment area,
beyond the area on the Effective Date, of any natural or
artificial drainage or drain, which receives drainage
waters from India, or, except in an emergency, to pour
any waters into it in excess of the quantities received by it
as on the Effective Date, Pakistan shall, before
undertaking any work for these purposes, increase the
capacity of that drainage or drain to the extent necessary
so as not to impair its efficacy for dealing with drainage
waters received from India as on the Effective Date.178

DAVID L. FELDMAN, WATER, 124-155 (2013); see also Daniel Markey,
Pakistan, in, CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A COUNTRYLEVEL ANALYSIS, 87 (Daniel Moran ed., 2011).
177 See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV ¶ 4, 3, 6. 8, Sept 19, 1960
419 U.N.T.S. 6032.
178 Id.
176
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The effective date, here, implies the date of the
signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article IV
also mentions particular drainages—the Kasur Nala, the
Fazilka Drain, the Hudiara Drain, and the Salimshah
Drain—and recommends that Pakistan should manage them
properly in such a manner that no water should reach them
beyond their capacities.179 That is, Pakistan can make
adjustments to the capacities of these drains so they capture
an adequate flow of water India drains.180 This is particularly
helpful for managing the surplus water India drains during
emergencies like heavy rainfall and flood threats. The
purpose of this provision is to protect Pakistani regions near
these drainage basins from being inundated by surplus
water.
Nonetheless, the central issue is India usually does
not share accurate data related to the surplus water it
intends to drain toward Pakistan, particularly when there is
a prevalent sense of hostility and distrust between the
states.181 Therefore, Pakistan can only make assumptions
based on previous trends of water drained by India. This
involves, for Pakistan, inefficacies and problems in
managing the drainage basins, which, in fact, are caused by
India’s uncooperative behavior.182

See id.
See id.
181 ALIAR HOSSAIN & MARK T. JONES, DEVELOPING THE MINISTERIAL
MINDSET: A GLOBAL VIEW 36 (Author House, 2013). [hereinafter: Hossain
& Jones].
182 As elucidated above that India does not share the accurate current
river data with Pakistan; therefore, we can conclude that Pakistan, at
most of the times, may lack data for forecasting estimations regarding
the upcoming flow of water discharged by India in river basins. This
would create inefficacies in water management, especially in the events
179
180
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C. WATER MANAGEMENT FOR PREVENTING FLOOD
DAMAGES—ARTICLE IV
The Indus Waters Treaty also includes provisions to
prevent the adverse effects of flooding on each riparian state.
In this regard, it allows the construction of new endeavors
for managing surplus water resources to prevent floods, as
set out above. However, the treaty also requires each state to
not cause harm to the other when constructing any scheme
or project for preventing floods or managing surplus
water.183 India naturally bears more responsibility because it
is an upper riparian state and can divert the flow of rivers
toward Pakistan to protect its own territory from being
flooded during rainy seasons. Therefore, the Indus Waters
Treaty specifically instructs India (Paragraph 2 of Article IV)
to not cause any harm to Pakistan in carrying out its floodmanagement endeavors.184 The wording of the article is:
In executing any scheme of flood protection or flood
control each Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any
material damage to the other Party, and any such scheme
carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not
involve any use of water or any storage in addition to that
provided under Article III.185

of flooding, for Pakistan. Regarding India’s noncooperation in terms of
not sharing river data, see Id.
183 See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV ¶ 2, 3, 6. 8, Sept 19, 1960
419 U.N.T.S. 6032.
184 See id. art. IV ¶ 2.
185 See id.
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Here, the point of Article III is to prevent India from
any consumptive diversion of Western Rivers waters,
whether intended to prevent floods in its own territory or for
any other reason.186 This is because consumptive use or
diversion of the Western Rivers by India is regarded as an
action causing harm to Pakistan,187 for it can result either in a
shortage of water or flooding during abnormal decreases or
increases in rainfall, respectively.
Despite the provision entailing prohibition of the
consumptive use of Western Rivers, India has continued
constructing new hydropower and water-storage dams on
the Western Rivers within its territory, and Pakistan has
repeatedly complained to India about its consumptive use of
Western Rivers waters.188 The Wullar Barrage and
Kishanganga Dam are prominent examples of this, being
Indian attempts to construct on Jhelum and Neelum Rivers,
respectively.189
D. UNRESTRICTED USE—ARTICLES II AND III
Article II of the Indus Waters Treaty approves the
unrestricted use of waters of the Eastern Rivers to India, and
it allows Pakistan the use of water of these rivers for only
non-consumptive purposes.190 This means India can
construct dams or barrages and can use the water of the
Eastern Rivers for any purpose. However, Pakistan can use
the water of these rivers for agriculture or domestic

SHYAM KISHOR AGARWAL, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSIES 86 (2002)
Id.
188 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79; see also Naz, supra note 123, at 105.
189 Id.
190 Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV, Sept. 19, 1960.
186
187
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purposes, and for any purpose that does not result in storage
or diversion of large flows of water of the Eastern Rivers.191
On the other hand, Article III provides Pakistan with
the right to the unrestricted use of the Western Rivers, but it
also allows India the use of waters of the Western Rivers for
domestic, agricultural, and hydropower generation, with the
core restriction of not diverting or affecting their natural
flow.192 Hence, both states have been restricted from the
consumptive use of waters of rivers allocated to the other.
However, India is not fully obeying this provision and has
initiated dozens of hydropower projects that not only have
the capacity to store large quantities of Pakistani Western
River waters but also are intended to divert the streams of
these river waters and thus have the potential for
consumptive use of the water of these rivers. For instance, as
set out above, the Kishanganga Dam, constructed by India
on the Jhelum and Neelum Rivers, has the potential to affect
the natural run of this river by either substantially reducing
or inundating it, as per Indian unilateral will.193
It is the “unrestricted use”194 of the Western Rivers
allocated to Pakistan by the Indus Waters Treaty that
provides legal leverage to Pakistan over the waters of these
rivers to manage them in any way that serves the agrarian,
domestic, hydropower, and all other water-related
requirements of Pakistan.195 That is, Pakistan can manage the
waters of the Western Rivers through diversion or storage of
their waters or through any means. Pakistan can construct

Id.
See id. at art. III.
193 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79.
194 See generally Indus Waters Treaty, art. III, Sept. 19, 1960.
195 See id. at art III ¶ 2 & 3.
191
192
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new dams, barrages, or canals for agriculture and electricity
generation purposes. However, such water-management
endeavors of Pakistan on these rivers can be affected
adversely if Indian water-storage projects continue to
obstruct water flow in the Western Rivers, leading to a
decline in the amount of water available for dams, canals,
barrages, and other water-management ventures in Pakistan.
E. CONSTRUCTION OF ENGINEERING WORKS ON THE INDUS
BASIN—ARTICLE VII
Although both of the two states can initiate
engineering works on the Indus Basin for any beneficial
purpose, the water of the Indus Basin is the shared property
of both states and does not belong solely to either, so Article
VII of the Indus Waters Treaty compels each state to inform
the other of plans for constructing any engineering work in
the Indus Basin that will use the basin’s water.196 This
provision means one state should not initiate engineering
work in the Indus Basin without notifying the other,
particularly when the engineering work could affect water
availability in the other state’s part of the basin.197 Hence,
neither India nor Pakistan can accomplish any watermanagement engineering project in the Indus Basin without
sharing relevant information, including detailed plans,
accurate data relating to the functioning of the project, and
the size, nature, and effect of the project. Paragraph 2 of
Article VII states:198

See id. at art. IV, ¶ 2 (implementation is required if the engineering
works have the potential of affecting the other state).
197 Id.
198 See id.
196
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If either Party plans to construct any engineering work
which would cause interference with the waters of any of
the Rivers and which, in its opinion, would affect the
other Party materially, it shall notify the other Party of its
plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as
may be available and as would enable the other Party to
inform itself of the nature, magnitude and effect of the
work.199
If India and Pakistan could follow this provision to its
fullest, then no conflict would arise related to the
distribution and use of the Indus Basin or to any watermanagement engineering project initiated by either state in
the basin. This is because both states would inform the other
of its water-management engineering works, which would
induce both states to discuss the relevant objections by either
side to engineering works in the Indus Basin. Consequently,
if discussions remain fruitful and unaffected by past or
present hostilities, both states can resolve their objections to
the engineering works together.
Unfortunately, the reality is contrary to the guidelines
provided in this provision of the Indus Waters Treaty
because India never shares with Pakistan the information
related to its water-management engineering works.200 India
starts constructing its water-management engineering
works, whether they are large-storage-capacity dams or
hydropower projects or barrages, unilaterally and without
notifying Pakistan.201 This instigates conflict in which

Id.
See Hossain & Jones, supra note 181, at 36.
201 Id.
199
200
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Pakistan has to express its reservations to the Indian waterstorage project because of the controversial nature of the
storage facility or functioning of the project. This has been
the case for several water-management engineering works
by India, including some of India’s major dams and
barrages.202 Pakistan has not been provided adequate
answers and information for twenty-seven controversial
Indian water-management projects.203
Overall, these provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty
indicate its keenness to guide Pakistan and India in their
water management endeavors.204 Notably, the Indus Waters
Treaty is the only agreement between the two states that has
stood for several years and has done so despite ongoing
hostilities.205 It is the only treaty that has laid out a
framework and scheme for the equitable distribution of their
shared transboundary river waters.206
Therefore, this treaty has foremost importance for
both states.207 Its endorsement of effective watermanagement schemes is a marked example of a treaty
guiding states to not only distribute and utilize but also

See Akhtar, supra note 82.
Id. at 15.
204 See Marsden, supra note 164.
205 RAMESH THAKUR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES 163 (Springer,
2016); See also P.C. BANSIL, WATER MANAGEMENT IN INDIA 37 (2004).
206 Singh, supra note 48, at 108; see also R.B. MANDAL, WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 51 (2006).
207 JASPARRO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER RESOURCES IN
HIMALAYAN ASIA 46 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). [hereinafter JASPARRO
ET AL.].
202
203
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manage their transboundary river waters effectively through
joint cooperative management of the shared river basin.208
IV.

WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE INDUS BASIN IN COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law guides riparian states in managing
water optimally to benefit both upper and lower riparian
states.209 These rules are incorporated in certain declarations
and conventions, which have been endorsed and accepted
by most states worldwide. The purpose of international law
in guiding riparian states in managing water is to ensure
transboundary waters are international water and not the
private property of a particular country.210
Therefore,
states
that
share
transboundary
international watercourses have an obligation to follow
international water laws and relevant principles for
equitably sharing and using international water resources,
preferably in a way that doesn’t bring harm or injustice to
other states.

See KISHOR UPRETY, CHALLENGES, LESSONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR
OPERATIONALIZING REGIONAL PROJECTS IN ASIA: LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 47 (2014).
209 VIRPI STUCKI ET AL., WATER AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: SOLVING A
RUBIK'S CUBE (ROUTLEDGE, 2016); see also UNEP/UNDP JOINT PROJECT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA, DEVELOPMENT AND
HARMONIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 26 (1999). [Hereinafter:
UNEP/UNDP].
210 Akunga Momanyi, Re-thinking Estuaries Ecosystem Governance in the
WIO Region, in, ESTUARIES: A LIFELINE OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN THE
WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN 243 (Peter Scheren, Salif Diop, and, John
Ferdinand Machiwa, eds., 2016).
208
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A. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

International law stresses maintaining the quality of
water in river basins.211 It also urges states to make
environment assessments related to their water resources.212
1. THE BERLIN RULES
In this regard, Articles 27 to 33 of the Berlin Rules
strictly instruct states to take adequate measures to not only
prevent pollution but also remove hazardous substances that
have already been discharged into watercourses by factories
and other entities.213 Furthermore, Article 28 explains the
purpose of maintaining water quality: “States shall establish
water quality standards sufficient to protect public health.”214
Maintaining quality freshwater resources results in
preserving health for the people who use that water resource
for drinking and domestic purposes.215 Furthermore,
improved quality of irrigation water is also essential for
crops; that is, irrigating water should not contain nutrients

LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 160 (OUP Oxford, ed. 2013). [hereinafter Boisson]; see also Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes, The Role of Diplomatic Means of Solving Water
Disputes: A Special Emphasis on Institutional Mechanisms, in, RESOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES, 101-104, (Int’l Bureau of the
Permanent Ct. of Arb., ed., 2002).
2013).
212 See also UNEP/UNDP, supra note 209 at 26.
213 See INT’L LAW ASS’N, BERLIN CONFERENCE (2004), WATER RES. LAW,
FOURTH REP., ARTICLES 27 TO 33. [Berlin Conference].
214 Id. at art. 28.
215 See Boisson, supra note 211, at 160; see also UNESCO, THE U.N. WORLD
WATER DEV. REP. 4: MANAGING WATER UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 24
(2012).
211
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that are harmful to crops.216 This is applicable to both India
and Pakistan. Both states are dependent on agriculture for
fulfilling their demands for food and adding production
value to their GDP.217 Because the preservation of the natural
aquatic environment is the main intention of these laws,
both countries must take adequate measures to prevent
pollution in their shared river courses, as well as in their
other freshwater resources. For this purpose, states must
also review their water-management projects so as to assess
their effect on the environment. This is also recommended in
Article 31 of the Berlin Rules, which stresses assessment of
watercourses, environments, ecosystems, human health,
ecology, and other activities that may be directly affected by
a water-management project.218 Article 29 further requires
that states make assessments of their watercourses.219 The
language of the article is as follows:
1. States shall undertake prior and continuing assessment
of the impact of programs, projects, or activities that may
have a significant effect on the aquatic environment or the
sustainable development of waters.220
2. Impacts to be assessed include, among others:
a. Effects on human health and safety;
b. Effects on the environment;

See generally AMOS FEIGIN ET AL., IRRICATION WITH TREATED SEWAGE
EFFLUENT 25-26, (E. Bresler et al. eds., 1991) (discussing the beneficial and
harmful nutrients in the irrigation water for crops).
217 Ashok Gulati & Garry Pursell, India and Other South Asian Countries,
in, DISTORTIONS TO AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE,
1955-2007, 390 (Kym Anderson ed., 2009).
218 Berlin Conference, supra note 213, at art. 31.
219See Id. at art 29.
220 Id. at art 29, ¶ 1.
216
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c. Effects on existing or prospective economic activity;
d. Effects on cultural or socio-economic conditions; and
e. Effects on the sustainability of the use of waters.221
Moreover, Article 8 of the Berlin Rules, which is titled
“Minimization of Environmental Harm,” prohibits states
from causing any harm or damage to the environment in
their water-management endeavors.222 It reads “States shall
take all appropriate measures to prevent or minimize
environmental harm.”223This means India must make certain
arrangements to prevent or mitigate the chances of causing
environmental harm to the Indus River Basin. Pertinently,
India’s Kishanganga Dam is a threat to the natural aquatic
environment and agrarian lands of the Neelum Valley in
Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir because the dam includes a plan to
divert the Neelum River water away from the Neelum
Valley.224
Owing to the significant environmental harm
associated with the Kishanganga Dam and in accordance
with the international legal obligation to not cause harm to
the environment, India must either halt the controversial
Kishanganga project or make substantial adjustments to its
implementation plan to make it favorable enough for the
natural environment of the Neelum Valley.

Id. at art 29, ¶ 2.
Id. at art 8.
223 Id.
224 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79.
221
222
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2. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION
The preservation of the ecosystem is paramount and
obligatory on all riparian states.225 In addition to the Berlin
Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention also endorses the
protection of ecosystems and related environmental life.
Article 20 of the UNWC reads: “Watercourse States shall,
individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve
the ecosystems of international watercourses.”226
This further implies an obligation on all states to
preserve and protect the natural ecosystem linked with
international watercourses.227 However, for the natural
Indus Basin, Indian endeavors to complete the controversial
Kishanganga Dam that appears to be contrary to this
principle.228 As, the construction of Kishanganda dam
carried harm to the natural environment of the Neelum
Valley;229 therefore, the construction of this dam can be
regarded as a violation to the UN Watercourses Convention,
which endorses protection of the natural environment of
international watercourses.230 Hence, in accordance with
Article 20 of the UN Watercourses Convention, India should
assess the environmental harm of the Kishanganga Dam on

ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE, INT’L LAW & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
LESSONS FROM THE LAW OF INT’L WATERCOURSES 141 (Patricia Wouters &
Sergei Vinogradov eds., 2005) [Hereinafter: RIEU-CLARKE].
226 G.A. Res. 51/229, art. 20 U.N. Doc A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1997).
227 See id.
228 As elucidated above that the Kishanganga dam entails significant
harm to the natural environment of the Neelum Valley as the dam can
deprive the Valley from 27% of water of Neelum River, which can cause
negative effects on the existing agrarian environment of the Valley. See
Chaturvedi, supra note 127, at 169.
229 Id.
230 See G.A. Res. 51/229, art. 20 U.N. Doc A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1997).
225
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the Neelum Valley. For the purposes of such an assessment,
India can make joint arrangements with Pakistan. It can take
suggestions from Pakistan to ensure minimum harm is
caused to the Neelum Valley region from its Kishanganga
Dam.
3. SUPPLEMENTAL RULES ON POLLUTION
Article 3 of the Supplemental Rules on Pollution is
relevant to the discourse of assessing the effects of the
Kishanganga Dam on the Neelum Valley. Article 3
recommends that:
in using the waters of an international drainage basin,
States individually or jointly as appropriate shall ensure
prior assessment of the impact of programs or projects
that may have significant transboundary effect on the
environment or on the sustainable use of the waters.231
Nonetheless, India has not taken any measures before
initiating the Kishanganga Dam to assess its environmental
impacts, and Pakistan has already expressed its concerns
related to its damaging environmental consequences for the
Neelum Valley in Azad Kashmir.232

See The Int’l Law Ass’n, Rep. of the Sixty-Seventh Conf. Held at
Helinski 414, 1996; see also Rieu-Clarke, supra note 225, at 141.
232 See Jasparro et al., supra note 207, at 96; see also Leb et al., supra note
128, at 417.
231
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B. NO-HARM PRINCIPLE
According to the no-harm principle, one riparian state
must minimize the harm to the other, and it must not cause
any additional significant harm to another state through any
of its water management-endeavors.233 This principle has
been endorsed by the International Law Association (ILA),
the United Nations, World Commission on Dams (WCD),
World Commission on Water for 21st Century (WCW), and
the World Water Council (WWC).234
1. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION, ARTICLE 7:
OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE HARM
Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention
(UNWC) has included an application of this principle, titled
“obligation not to cause significant harm,” in defining a
relationship between the riparian states for sharing a
transboundary watercourse.235 Article 7 of the UNWC
explicitly prevents riparian states from causing any
significant harm to the other state in any manner.236 It reads:
Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international
watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate

PHILIP ALSTON & SARAH KNUCKEY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS FACT-FINDING, 145 (Oxford University Press, 2015).
234 See SALMAN M.A. SALMAN, THE WORLD BANK POLICY FOR PROJECTS ON
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS, 56–
57 (World Bank Publications, 2009).
235 See Article of UN Watercourses Convention 1997.
236 Id.
233
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measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to
other watercourse States.237
Hence, in accordance with the UN Watercourses
Convention, in accomplishing its own water management
endeavors India must not cause harm to other riparian
states, i.e., Pakistan. This principle is similar to an article of
the Belgrade Rules, as set out below.
2. THE BELGRADE RULES
Article 1 of the Belgrade Rules on the Relationship of
International Water Resources with other Natural Resources
and Environmental Elements requires that:
States shall ensure that [t]he development and use of
water resources within their jurisdiction do not cause
substantial injury to the environment of other States.238
This rule is by Article IV of the Helsinki Rules, which
has a similar provision preventing states from causing any
significant harm or damage to other states or to their
environments.239
Nonetheless, India has not followed these principles,
and its newly planned and initiated water storage projects
on the western rivers are causing significant harm to
Pakistan in terms of depriving it of its due share of the

Article 7, UN Watercourses Convention, 1997.
See Article 1, Belgrade Rules, 1980; see also CHARLES B. BOURNE,
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW, 262 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997).
239 SLAVKO BOGDANOVIĆ, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES:
CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (1954–2000), 33
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001).
237
238
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western river waters.240 The average annual flows in the
Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus Rivers have already fallen to a
great extent, as set out in the introduction to this paper.241 If
the contentious Indian projects under construction are
completed, there would be a further reduction of the average
annual flow of water in the western rivers, which will
threaten the agricultural infrastructure in Pakistan.242 Such
harm would be significant enough to cause a decline in
agricultural production and, consequently, to the GDP and
growth rate of Pakistan, because the agriculture contributes
to the GDP to a great extent in Pakistan.243
C. JOINT WATER MANAGEMENT OR BASIN-WIDE JOINT
MANAGEMENT
Joint water management is becoming popular in the
international discourse of water management244 because it is
considered the most effective way of managing

For details about Pakistan’s perceptions related to the likely harm
carried by the Baglihar dam see Dinar et al., supra note 138, at 332; see also
the details about Pakistan’s concerns related to the harm carried by the
Kishanganga Dam see Magsig, supra note 159, at 79; For detailed
discussion regarding the harm carried by Wullar Barrage see Akhtar,
supra note 82, at 31-32.
241 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 2.
242 Qureshi et al., supra note 30, at 1.
243 See Choudhary et. al, supra note 25 at 127.
244 OLE KRISTIAN FAUCHALD, DAVID HUNTER, & WANG XI, YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 2008, 111 (Oxford University
Press, 2009); see also Patricia Wouters, Sergei Vinogradov, & Bjørn-Oliver
Magsig, Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River
Runs Through It . . ., 19 Y.B. OF INT’L ENVTL. L., 97, 111 (2008).
240
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transboundary watercourses245 It endorses equitable
utilization, sustainable development, and integrated
management of water resources.246 Moreover, it also ensures
the mutual benefit of all parties that take part in the joint
management of common water resources.247
This technique can be adopted by India and Pakistan
for collaboratively managing and developing the Indus
Basin and incurring mutual benefits from it.248 The
possibility of implementing the joint water-management
schemes for the Indus Basin can prevent disputes relating to
water resources between the two countries,249 because every
water-management project on the Indus Basin will be

DINARA ZIGANSHINA, PROMOTING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SECURITY
ARAL SEA BASIN THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (2014)
[hereinafter ZIGANSHINA].
246 See H. Hötzl, J. Guttman, E. Salameh, AR. Tamimi, State of water
strategy and policy, in THE WATER OF THE JORDAN VALLEY: SCARCITY AND
DETERIORATION OF GROUNDWATER AND ITS IMPACT ON THE REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 481, 498 (Eliahu Rosenthal, Heinz Hötzl, & Peter Möller
eds., 2008); see WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, UNESCO, WATER:
A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 394 (2006) (describing an example of joint
water management for the equitable utilization of watercourses).
247 Marwa Daoudy, Getting Beyond the Environment-Conflict Trap: Benefit
Sharing in International River Basins, in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 43, 51 (Anton Earle et al. ed.,
2013); see also Annika Kramer, Challenges to water cooperation in the lower
Jordan river Basin, in WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
686, 699 (R. Quentin Grafton & Karen Hussey eds., 2011).
248 C. J. BARROW, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 51
(2005).
249 See MANUEL SCHIFFLER& WALTINA SCHEUMANN, WATER IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICTS AND PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION 5
(2013).
245
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implemented with mutual consultation, consent, and
cooperation through joint-management mechanisms.250
Provisions in international law govern certain aspects
of basin-wide joint management.251 Here we will explore the
Berlin Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention, and the
Rules on the Regulation of the Flow of International
Watercourses, specifically focusing on their provisions on
basin-wide joint management at the international level.
1. BERLIN RULES, ARTICLES 64, 65, AND 67
Article 64 of the Berlin Rules endorses the joint
management of a transboundary river basin in the following
words: “[w]hen appropriate, basin States shall establish other
joint mechanisms for the management of waters.”252
Article 65 of the Berlin Rules also details aspects that
can be covered by joint management mechanisms:253 it
recommends collaboration from both sides on technical and
scientific expertise and research programs related to the
development, upgrade, and optimal utilization of the shared

Flavia Rocha Loures, History and Status of the Community-of-Interests
Doctrine, 2 A HIST. OF WATER SER. NO. 3: SOVEREIGNTY AND INT’L WATER
L., 212, 225 (2015); see also Ziganshina, supra note 245.
251 AYȘEGÜL KIBAROĞLU, BUILDING A REGIME FOR THE WATERS OF THE
EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN 157 (2002) [hereinafter KIBAROĞLU]; see
also Yuldash Khudayberganov, Security and Water Resources Management
Problems and Experience in the Amudarya River Basin, in WATER AND FOOD
SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA 59, 66 (Chandra Madramootoo & Victor
Dukhoyny eds., 2008).
252Int’l Law Ass’n, The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, (XI) art. 64 (2004),
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berli
n_Rules-2004.pdf.
253 Id. at (XI) art. 65.
250
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basin from both sides.254 Article 65 further recommends
signing a formal agreement between the parties to finalize
arrangements related to joint expense management, the legal
sphere of the joint collaboration, the functioning of the joint
mechanisms, the duration of the joint endeavors, the roles
and authorities of joint bodies, and the key objectives of joint
management of the shared river basin.255
Pertinently, these things being finalized before the
establishment of a joint-management system for the Indus
Basin would help India and Pakistan collaborate without
raising conflicts in the management, utilization, and
development of the Indus Basin. Both will be able to resolve
their differences and put their joint efforts for upgrading of
the Indus Basin to reap mutual benefits.
2. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION
The UN Watercourses Convention has endorsements
for the establishment of joint mechanisms for developing
and using international watercourses.256 Article 24 of the
Convention sets out its support for the joint management of
transboundary watercourses:
Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them,
enter into consultations concerning the management of
an international watercourse, which may include the
establishment of a joint management mechanism.257

Id.
Id.
256 See Kibaroğlu, supra note 251, at 157.
257 G.A. Res. 51/229 art. 24, Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses (May 21, 1997).
254
255
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The management of international watercourses is also
defined in the text of this article:258
Management refers, in particular, to:
a) Planning the sustainable development of an
international watercourse and providing for the
implementation of any plans adopted; and
b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal
utilization, protection and control of the watercourse.259
Thus, the management of an international watercourse is
related to the planning, sustainable development, protection,
and optimal utilization of water resources.
This implies if either of the two rival states, India and
Pakistan, wants to initiate a joint mechanism for Indus water
management through mutual bilateral support and
collaboration and also sends a formal request to the other
state, the state receiving the request would be required to
facilitate collaboration and consultation with the other to
establish the joint water-management mechanism. This can
ensure a purposeful orientation of consultation between the
states and, if such consultations are successful, would build
a new wave of coordination and mutual trust between the
states. Furthermore, such joint management of the basin
would contribute to the development, upgrading, and
optimal use of the basin. The joint management would also
not result in harm to either state from any water
management endeavor in the Indus Basin.

258
259

Id.
Id.
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D. SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT
Sustainable management of water resources is the
most popular idea in the international legal arena, but
achieving it is also one of the greatest current challenges
related to water management.260 Sustainable management of
a water resource is beneficial for its upgrading as well as
preservation.261 Moreover, it results in an environmentally
friendly use of the water resource.262 International law has
offered tremendous support for the sustainable management
of international water resources.263
1. BERLIN RULES
Article 7 of the Berlin Rules explicitly instructs states
to take substantial steps to sustainably manage water
resources.264 It reads: [s]tates shall take all appropriate measures
to manage waters sustainably.265 Article 40 repeats the goal:266

A. Berndardi et al., Managing Central Asia’s transboundary rivers: case
studies
of
the
Zaarafshan
(Tajikistan/Uzbekistan)
and
Tarim
(Kyrgyzstan/China) rivers, in 8 WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 149, 150
(C. A. Brebbia ed., 2015).
261 RICHARD LONGSTRETH, SUSTAINABILITY & HISTORIC PRESERVATION:
TOWARD A HOLISTIC VIEW, 83-93 (University of Delaware Press, 2011).
262 IMPACT SCIENCES, INC. & SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, NEWHALL RANCH RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND SPINEFLOWER CONSERVATION PLAN:
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 16–17 (RDMP-SCP EIS’EIR, 2010).
263
ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE & FLAVIA ROCHA LOURES, THE UN
WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL
LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT, 281 (Routledge, 2013).
264 See Berlin Conference on Water Resources, art. 7 Aug. 21, 2004, ILA.
265 Id.
266 Berlin Conference on Water Resources, art. 40 Aug. 21, 2004, ILA.
260
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States shall give effect to the principle of sustainability in
managing aquifers, taking into account natural and artificial
recharge.267
In addition to the surface water resources, the Berlin
Rules also recommend states pay attention to sustainably
managing groundwater resources. Article 38 of the Rules
recommends states take adequate action to sustainably
manage groundwater resources and aquifers.268 This
principle is fully applicable to India and Pakistan, which rely
heavily on the use of groundwater for irrigating crops in
regions river water does not reach.269 Because of the
excessive use of groundwater resources in these regions,
groundwater levels are depleting and possibly harming the
future availability of groundwater in these regions.270
Therefore, both states need to take adequate measures to
sustainably develop and manage the river basin water to
reduce their dependence on groundwater use.
2. THE JOHANNESBURG DECLARATION ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The Johannesburg Declaration supports the
sustainable development of the natural ecosystem and

Id.
Id.
269 K.G. Villholth et al., The Role of Groundwater in Agriculture, Livelihoods,
and Rural poverty Alleviation in the Indo-Gangetic and Yellow River Basins: A
Review, in, GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE IN THE INDO-GANGETIC AND
YELLOW RIVER BASINS 3 (Aditi Mukherji et al., 2009).
270 Id.
267
268
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resources.271 It elucidates the benefits of achieving
sustainable development in all fields.272 According to the
declaration, sustainable development leads to improved
quality of life.273 Furthermore, for achieving sustainable
development, it is also essential that resources are upgraded
for their long-term sustenance and protection; for instance,
the water resources should be protected from pollution and
degradation.274 Special measures taken for the upgrading of
a water resource can lead to its sustainable development.275
India and Pakistan both need to take such measures
for the well-being, upgrading, and development of the Indus
Basin to achieve sustainable development in the basin. This
is required because sustainable development prevents the
depletion of natural resources,276 and the Indus Basin is
important enough to both states that it will be protected
from becoming depleted.

INDEX TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SUBJECT INDEX:
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 57TH SESSION 2002/2003, 99 (United Nations
Publications, 2004).
272 Id.
273 Meeting of Senior Officials and Ministers of health, Johannesburg
Declaration
on
Health
and
Sustainable
Development,
3,
WHO/HDE/HID/02.8 (January 19-22, 2002).
274 Id. at 8.
275 Id.
276KAILASH CHANDRA BEBARTA, FOREST RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES, PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 104 (New Delhi
Concept Publishing 2004).
271
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V. CONCLUSION
Water management is one of the most important
requirements of the agricultural economy of Pakistan.277
However, the adverse changes in climate and the obstruction
of flow of water by the Indian water-storage works are
causing issues for water management in Pakistan.278 The
government of Pakistan has plans to construct new waterstorage facilities in the country;279 however, certain new
Indian water-storage projects are causing an increase in cost
for the projects under construction in Pakistan.280 For
instance, India’s Kishanganga Dam’s construction has
induced Pakistan to complete its Neelum–Jhelum power
project so as to acquire adequate water for the project from
the Neelum River before India uses it for its Kishanganga
Dam. This is in accordance with the prior-appropriation
rule, which states the country that uses a particular water
resource first is the legitimate owner of that resource.281 The
Kishanganga Dam poses a direct threat to water availability
in the Neelum Valley and for the Neelum–Jhelum project.282

Dr. Badruddin Soomro, Inaugural Address by the Chief Guest, in,
SUSTAINING SURFACE AND GROUNDWATER RESOURCES: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON CONJUNCTIVE WATER MANAGEMENT
FOR SUSTAINABLE IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN SOUTH ASIA 11 (Asad
Sarwar Qureshi et al. eds., IWMI 2002).
278 See Akhtar, supra note 82, at 1-2,4; see also SAEID ESLAMIAN, HANDBOOK
OF ENGINEERING HYDROLOGY: MODELING, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND
VARIABILITY 119 (CRC Press 2014).
279 Singh, supra note 48, at 233.
280 For instance, see WAPDA, supra note 156.
281See Sheila Rai & Sanghamitra, Water Dispute in South Asia, in, WATER
RESOURCE CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, 125 (Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi, ed., 2012).
282 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79.
277

2017

INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT

123

In addition to the Kishanganga Dam, there are several
Indian water-storage projects that are threatening irrigation
and water-management practices in Pakistan by reducing
the flow of river waters to Pakistan.283 The average annual
flow of waters in the Pakistani rivers has already declined
significantly.284 Furthermore, the storage capacities of the
largest water-storage facilities in Pakistan, the Tarbela, the
Mangla, Chashma, and other smaller dams, have decreased
to a great extent.285 This is creating a challenging situation
for the existing water-management endeavors of Pakistan.
Pakistan has repeatedly requested India reconsider its new
water-storage projects because these projects have the
potential to cause significant harm to the natural water
flows, agriculture, and ecosystem in Pakistan; however,
India has mostly neglected Pakistan’s concerns.286
Negative effects on agriculture mean an adverse
impact on the economy in Pakistan. This is because
agriculture is an important pillar of Pakistan’s economy
because it is the largest sector in terms of national GDP.287
International law prevents such measures by India,
for principles and rules of international law prohibit
inflicting any significant harm to the natural environment of
one state by another in fulfilling its water-management
endeavors. Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention
and Article 1 of the Belgrade Rules are focused on the

See Akhtar, supra note 82, at 15.
See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 2.
285 Chaturvedi, supra note 127, at 141.
286 For instance, details regarding the Baglihar Dam see Dinar et al., supra
note 138, at 332; See also Indian rejection of Pakistan’s stance and
countering it with arguments for the Wullar Barrage in: Akhtar, Supra
note 82, at 31.
287 Choudhary, supra note 25, at 127.
283
284
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obligation on states to not cause any significant harm to
others.288
Furthermore, the Berlin Rules, the UN Watercourses
Convention, and the Supplemental Rules on Pollution also
make it obligatory for a state to make an appropriate
assessment of the environmental impacts of its water
management practices within its territory as well as on
neighboring states. However, India appears to be
noncompliant with these conventions and rules of
international law because it has not made appropriate
assessments of the adverse effects on the natural
environment and water habitat that its water storage works
carry with them.
In addition to the international conventions and
principles, the Indus Waters Treaty, which is a bilateral legal
agreement between India and Pakistan, prohibits India from
causing any harm in pursuing its water-management
endeavors to Pakistan.289 It prevents India from taking
consumptive use of water in the western rivers.290 However,
according to Pakistan, certain Indian water-management
projects on the western rivers have caused violations of the
Indus Waters Treaty because of their consumptive
utilization of the waters of western rivers.291 For instance, the
Kishanganga Dam is being constructed on the Jhelum River
and has the potential to divert or substantially affect the
natural flow of the Jhelum River,292 which constitutes

For details, see Article 7 of UN Watercourses Convention and Article 1
of the Belgrade Rules.
289 See paragraph 3 of Article IV, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
290 See Article III, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. See also Agarwal, supra note
186, at 86.
291 See Naz, supra note 123, at 105.
292 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79.
288
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consumptive use of the Jhelum River water not allowed by
the Indus Waters Treaty.293
On the other hand, the Indus Waters Treaty also
includes policies and mechanisms for water management for
the mutual benefit of both states.294 After equitably
apportioning the Indus water between India and Pakistan, it
provides recommendations to Pakistan and India for
constructing their water management engineering works for
efficiently utilizing and benefitting from the Indus Basin.295
It also recommends that both states exchange data
with each other on a regular basis related to the flow of
water in their rivers and to their planned, underconstruction, and existing water-storage works.296 This has
been made obligatory by the Indus Waters Treaty so each
state may know about the water-management works of the
other state that are being constructed on the shared Indus
Basin.297
If India starts following the principles of the Indus
Waters Treaty, international conventions, and international
water laws, a great sense of cooperation for the sustainable
and basin-wide joint water management between India and
Pakistan can arise, which will produce mutual benefits for
both states. This is because both states require the water of

Id.; see also Agarwal, supra note 186, at 86.
See Hooper supra note 163, at 196.
295 See Article VII ¶ 2, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
296 Article VI, Indus Waters Treaty, 1960; see also Salman M.A. Salman,
International Financial Institutions and the Water Convention: Consultations
Arrangements, in, THE UNECE CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION AND USE
OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATERCOURSES AND INTERNATIONAL LAKES: ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL WATER COOPERATION, 519 (Attila
Tanzi et al., ed., Hotei Publishing, 2015).
297 See Bourne, supra note 238, at 163.
293
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the shared river basin for agriculture, hydropower
generation, drinking, and domestic purposes.298 However,
the current situation goes against this, because India has
reportedly threatened to revoke or modify the Indus Waters
Treaty to gain a greater share of water in the Indus Basin for
its water-management endeavors,299 which can lead to the
additional deprivation of Pakistan of its due share of water
in the Indus Basin and consequently threaten its existing and
planned water management schemes.

298Regarding

Indian uses of watercourses, see PUKHRAJ RAKHECHA &
VIJAY P. SINGH, APPLIED HYDROMETEOROLOGY, CHAPTER 6 (Springer,
2010); Regarding Pakistan’s uses of watercourses, see R. Meinzen-Dick,
Valuing the Multiple Sues of Irrigation Water, in, WATER: ECONOMICS,
MANAGEMENT AND DEMAND, 50 (M. Kay, & T. Franks, CRC Press, 2002).
299 Khaleeq Kiani, Interview: “Indus Treaty can't be Revoked Unilaterally,”
DAWN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.dawn.com/news/1286307

